Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements: Realizing the Potential by Gaines, Sanford E.
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 28 
Number 1 The Changing Tide of Trade: The 
Social, Political and Environmental Implications 
of Regional Trade Agreements (Volume XXVIII, 
No. 1) 
Article 10 
2008 
Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements: 
Realizing the Potential 
Sanford E. Gaines 
University of New Mexico School of Law, gaines@law.unm.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gaines, Sanford E. (2008) "Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements: Realizing the 
Potential," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 28 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol28/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
253 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: REALIZING THE POTENTIAL 
SANFORD E. GAINES* 
When the debate over trade and the environment moved from dim 
academic backwaters to political center stage in the early 1990s, it took on an 
ideological flavor that still lingers.  The political spotlight was especially 
strong and the ideological divide especially sharp in the debate over the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which the United States Congress 
voted to approve in November 1993.1  Over the ensuing fifteen years, a richer, 
more nuanced academic literature has grown up analyzing the relationship 
between the liberalization of trade and protection of the environment from 
many different perspectives, fortified by empirical studies, particularly in 
North America, of specific environmental changes associated with changes in 
trade relationships.  Meanwhile, the political spotlight has shifted away from 
trade, and the ideological debate has moderated to some extent.  With world 
trade liberalization initiatives at an impasse2 and regional agreements on the 
rise,3 it is timely to reassess the particular environmental protection risks and 
opportunities presented by regional trade agreements like NAFTA. 
This essay will begin by setting forth an analytical framework for 
considering the trade-environment relationship and the policy tools that can be 
deployed to reduce environmental risks and capture trade-environment 
synergies.  It will then consider whether those tools are more available or less 
available within a regional trade agreement system than in the multilateral 
trade agreement framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Finally, 
it will examine the variety of different structures and arrangements used in 
regional systems and identify the circumstances that best capture the positive 
elements of the relationship and contain the negative elements. 
 
* Director, Utton Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico School of Law.  
From 1992–94, Prof. Gaines was the Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for 
Environment and Natural Resources at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
 1. See ROBERT E. BALDWIN & CHRISTOPHER S. MAGEE, CONGRESSIONAL TRADE VOTES: 
FROM NAFTA APPROVAL TO FAST-TRACK DEFEAT 5–9 (2000). 
 2. Stephen Castle & Mark Landler, After 7 Years, Talks Collapse on World Trade, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A1. 
 3. Roberto V. Fiorentino et al., The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 
2006 Update 1–2 (WTO, Paper No. 12, 2007). 
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I.  THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
Commentators have remarked that the interaction between trade 
liberalization and trade law on the one hand and environmental conditions and 
environmental law on the other can take several different forms.  One classic 
formulation identifies four different challenges that trade may present for 
environmental protection: regulatory effects, competitiveness effects, scale and 
composition effects, and limits on the use of trade measures in pursuit of 
environmental protection goals.4  The first two challenges draw attention to 
possible effects of trade rules on national environmental regulation, the third 
focuses on the direct effects on the physical environment of economic activity 
stimulated by the open trading system, and the fourth points to a trade law 
doctrine that continues to be controversial in some quarters. 
A. Regulatory Effects 
 The proposition that trade law can affect a nation’s environmental 
regulations has two complementary facets.  One concern is that because 
fundamental principles of trade law prohibit a nation from erecting regulatory 
barriers that discriminate against imported goods, trade rules may oblige a 
country to accept products that do not meet its own environmental or health 
standards.  This concern is especially acute with respect to regulations known 
as sanitary or phytosanitary standards, which seek to prevent the introduction 
of agricultural pests and diseases or food and drug contaminants.  Trade law 
requires that such standards be based on scientific evidence and an assessment 
of risks.5  A case in point is the challenge to Europe’s regulation prohibiting 
the import of beef from cattle raised using growth hormones.  The United 
States and Canada prevailed in the WTO adjudication of their trade dispute on 
the ground that Europe could supply no scientific evidence showing any 
human health risk from eating such beef.6 
The complementary facet of the feared regulatory effect is that a nation’s 
choice among several regulatory options to address a particular environmental 
harm might be constrained by trade law.  The fear arises from the core trade 
law principles that a nation should choose the “least trade restrictive” measure 
among the regulatory options reasonably available to it and should not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against foreign products.  The latter test 
 
 4. See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 
42 (1994). 
 5. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, arts. 2, 5, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. 
 6. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998). 
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has been rather strictly applied.  For example, the WTO ruled that a United 
States ban on the import of gasoline from Venezuela and Brazil was 
inconsistent with trade obligations because the United States had not explored 
“adequately” the alternative of cooperation with the exporting countries or 
fairly considered the costs of its ban on gasoline from the foreign refiners, even 
though it was pursuing the legitimate objective of protecting its air quality.7 
B. Competitiveness Effects 
 The alleged competitiveness effect of trade on environmental protection is 
identified by a number of colorful descriptors: “pollution havens,” the “race to 
the bottom,” and H. Ross Perot’s infamous “giant sucking sound” of jobs 
supposedly going to Mexico under NAFTA.8  Logically, the competitiveness 
effect is a two-step process.  It begins with the proposition—unassailable in 
theory though generally not observed in the real world9—that domestic 
producers required to meet high environmental standards will be at a cost-of-
production disadvantage, and therefore a price disadvantage when competing 
with foreign producers facing lower environmental standards.10  The second 
step transmits that commercial competitive pressure to the political system, 
strengthening opposition from domestic producers to higher environmental 
standards in the name of protecting domestic businesses and domestic 
employment.  This political consequence of international trade competition is 
described as exerting downward pressure on domestic environmental standards 
or as having a chilling effect on environmental agencies considering new 
regulatory initiatives or higher regulatory standards.  Although some anecdotal 
cases seem to show such chilling of environmental regulation, the effect is 
notoriously difficult to document.  There is no evidence that it occurs on a 
broad scale. 
 
 7. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 20, 1996). 
 8. See ROSS PEROT & PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY NAFTA 
MUST BE STOPPED—NOW! 41 (1993);  Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade, Growth, 
and the Environment, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 29 (2004). 
 9. Copeland, supra note 8, at 34.  A recent review of the literature concludes: “While there 
is evidence of a pollution haven effect, it is only one of many factors that determine trade patterns, 
and there is no evidence that it is the dominant factor.” Id. at 67.  See generally, Sanford E. 
Gaines, Rethinking Environmental Protection, Competitiveness, and International Trade, 1997 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 231 (1997) (reviewing in detail the empirical economics literature on 
competitiveness). 
 10. The dominant explanation why the competitiveness effect does not show up in the real 
world is “that the costs imposed by environmental regulation are small relative to other 
considerations. . . . [T]here are large cost differences between locations due to factors such as 
transport, infrastructure and economic policy.” WORLD BANK, GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND 
POVERTY: BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE WORLD ECONOMY 132 (2002). 
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C. Scale and Composition Effects 
 The principal argument in favor of a new trade agreement is that the 
liberalization of trade will enhance economic efficiency and productivity in all 
trading partners, allowing increases in net production and resulting increases in 
national wealth.11  Other factors being equal, increased production of goods 
and services means an increase in the scale of economic activity, including 
increased consumption of natural resources and possibly increased pollution.  
In addition to increasing the scale of production, trade liberalization also 
intends to increase the volume of goods being exchanged across borders.  Thus 
the scale of transportation will also increase, with further environmental 
consequences from transport operations and the construction of additional 
transport infrastructure. 
Any change in the terms of trade between two countries will not only 
increase the volume of goods and services in international trade, but will also 
likely bring about a change in the composition of that trade in terms of the 
particular goods and services being produced and traded as the trading partners 
specialize in terms of their comparative advantage.  Whether the composition 
effect will increase or decrease environmental harms will depend, of course, on 
the particular changes that occur, but specifying the composition effect as a 
separate factor serves as an important reminder that what is produced and 
traded is often more important from an environmental perspective than the 
value or volume of trade in gross terms.  Environmental change through the 
composition effect can occur in the country of import as well as in the 
producing, or export, country.  For example, the increased access of very 
efficient U.S. corn producers to the market in Mexico under NAFTA has had 
ramifications for both countries, increasing chemical-intensive corn production 
slightly in the Untied States and tending to reduce the biological diversity of 
corn production in Mexico.12 
 
 11. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (noting the recognition of the parties that their relations “should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade 
in goods and services”). 
 12. Frank Ackerman et al., Free Trade, Corn, and the Environment: Environmental Impacts 
of US-Mexico Corn Trade Under NAFTA 1–2 (Global Dev. and Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 
03-06, 2003), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/03-06-NAFTACorn.pdf.  Cf. STEVEN 
ZAHNISER & WILLIAM COYLE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S.-MEXICO CORN TRADE DURING THE 
NAFTA ERA: NEW TWISTS TO AN OLD STORY 3–4 (2004), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
publications/FDS/may04/fds04D01/fds04D01.pdf. 
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D. Limits on the Use of Trade Measures for Environmental Purposes 
 The effect of trade law in restricting use of trade measures to advance 
environmental policy was especially controversial in the early years of trade-
environment policymaking.  As recent trade cases have made clear, there was 
never a substantial danger that trade rules would prevent nations from 
maintaining their own domestic environmental and health protections with 
respect to imported products.13  More problematic are trade measures directed, 
not at the product itself, but at some aspect of how the product was harvested 
or manufactured, often referred to in trade terminology as “processes or 
production methods” measures, or PPM measures for short. 
The notorious “Tuna/Dolphin” case that established the trade-environment 
relationship as a political question in 1991 was such a PPMs case.  Motivated 
by the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA),14 the U.S. State 
Department conducted a program to work with Latin American nations to 
reduce the mortality of dolphins in the tuna fishery of the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific.  Because of earlier disputes with the United States over tuna fishing, 
however, Mexico refused to cooperate with this initiative.  An environmental 
organization brought suit under the MMPA resulting in a court order requiring 
the U.S. government to invoke the statutory prohibition on imports of tuna 
from countries whose tuna fleets had dolphin mortality rates higher than those 
of the U.S. fleet.15 
Mexico challenged the resulting ban on the import of Mexican tuna into 
the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which was the predecessor to the WTO.16  A GATT dispute settlement panel 
ruled that the U.S. embargo on Mexican tuna was impermissible, articulating a 
general premise that it is inappropriate to ban import of a product on the basis 
of how that product was harvested, not because of any intrinsic characteristic 
of the product itself.17  Because the tuna caught by U.S. boats and Mexican 
boats was the same product, allowing one to be sold and banning the other 
constituted arbitrary discrimination.18  This holding prevented the invocation 
of Article XX of GATT, which otherwise authorizes an exception to GATT 
 
 13. See generally, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) 
(affirming French ban on the import of chyrsotile asbestos as an appropriate product regulation). 
 14. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972). 
 15. Section 101(a)(2) of the MMPA required the import ban.  Id.  The court decision 
mandating the ban on Mexican tuna is Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
 16. Report of the Panel, United States—Restriction on the Import of Tuna, DS21/R (Aug. 16, 
1991) (unadopted), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594. 
 17. Id. at 1622–23. 
 18. Id. at 1622. 
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rules for measures designed to conserve exhaustible natural resources.  Adding 
insult to injury, the panel was clearly antagonist to the idea that one country 
seeking to protect a resource outside its own jurisdiction could use trade 
restrictions to pressure another country into protecting that same resource. 
The Tuna/Dolphin decision’s severe limitation on unilateral trade 
restrictions to protect the environment or natural resources beyond national 
jurisdiction created a firestorm of environmental protest against GATT, carried 
over in less virulent terms to the WTO and other trade agreements.  Perhaps in 
response to the outrage, the Tuna/Dolphin report, which was never officially 
adopted,19 has been significantly relaxed through later decisions of the dispute 
settlement system under the WTO.  In a case very similar to Tuna/Dolphin, the 
WTO Appellate Body allowed the United States an exception under GATT 
Article XX for a regulatory program restricting imports of shrimp from certain 
Asian countries in order to protect endangered sea turtles from shrimp trawling 
operations by those countries that did not use U.S.-mandated turtle-excluder 
devices or comparably effective turtle protection strategies.20 
E. Summation 
Which among these four possible effects of trade on environmental policy 
are of practical significance?  In terms of the regulatory and competitiveness 
effects, challenges by foreign producers to domestic rules typically arise in two 
contexts.  First are challenges to sanitary regulations relating to food products.  
There is a long history of countries using food regulations with doubtful 
scientific support as a way to exclude imports of products that compete with 
domestic producers—such as U.S. restrictions on Mexican avocados or 
Japanese restrictions on U.S. apples.  However, these issues are usually 
resolved through the WTO dispute settlement21 or through negotiations.  
Accumulated studies of what has actually happened in terms of trade flows and 
investment flows over the past forty years of environmental regulation clearly 
show that competitiveness effects of differences in environmental standards 
arise only in isolated incidents and are dwarfed by other factors affecting 
competition.22  In short, if one looks at the overall performance of trade and the 
way a country like the United States makes changes to environmental laws and 
 
 19. Mexico, by that time deeply engaged in negotiating NAFTA with the United States, 
never asked the GATT Council to formally adopt the report findings.  Id. at 1594. 
 20. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products—Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 116, 154–55, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 20, 2001). 
 21. See generally, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Apples, WT/DS245/R (Nov. 26, 2003) (finding fault with Japan’s assessment of risks from 
U.S. apples). 
 22. See discussion supra Part B. 
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regulations, the regulatory and competitiveness effects of trade are almost 
imperceptible.23  It should also be noted that regional trade agreements do not 
present a different situation in this respect; most of them contain the same or 
similar language to WTO agreements on these product regulation matters. 
In contrast, the scale and composition effects of trade on the environment 
are real.  Increasing volumes of trade and changes in patterns of production go 
hand-in-hand with growing amounts of resource extraction, energy production, 
manufacturing and transport, all of which have significant environmental 
consequences. That said, these environmental effects are logically the 
consequence of private economic activity and public economic policy in 
general, not trade agreements specifically.  Trade-liberalizing agreements 
undoubtedly enhance the effects, but they do not drive them.  Consequently, 
managing the scale and composition effects of trade is largely beyond the 
direct control of trade policy or trade litigation.  A Nobel laureate economist, 
Trygve Haavelmo, observed many years ago: “Although many positive things 
can be said about liberalizing and thus increasing trade, the structure of trade, 
as we know it at present, is a curse from the perspective of sustainable 
development.”24  In other words, it is the accumulation of decentralized, 
mostly private, decisions about what and how much to produce and to trade, 
not the act of trading itself, that presents the most serious environmental 
threats.  As will be developed below in section II.B this implies that the 
significant environmental effects of trade agreements are not amenable to 
management through trade provisions themselves but arise from local and 
 
 23. Another trade mechanism that many environmental groups mention as a threat to 
domestic regulation is the investor-State arbitration procedure under which foreign investors can 
challenge local regulations that impair the value of their investments.  In the only such arbitration 
process that is being actively used, NAFTA Chapter 11, a close examination of the facts involved 
in the several environment-related arbitrations leads to the conclusion that investors have 
succeeded only where there were clear patterns of differential treatment between foreign and 
domestic firms or clear efforts to protect a domestic business from competition.  SANFORD E. 
GAINES, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION UNDER 
NAFTA CHAPTER 11 36–38 (2006) (report for the North American Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_docs/documents/index.cfm? 
varlan=english&ID=1825.  Challenges to bona fide environmental regulations applied in an even-
handed manner have been dismissed by the arbitration panels.  See generally Sanford E. Gaines, 
International Decisions Note, Methanex Corp. v. United States, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 683 (2006) 
(discussing how the arbitral tribunal dismissed Methanex’s challenge to California regulation of 
gasoline additives in its entirety and even awarded arbitration costs to the United States).  So even 
in the investment context, environmental concern over regulatory effects are arguably driven 
more by abstract or misdirected fears rather than any pattern of results in actual cases. 
 24. Trygve Haavelmo & Stein Hansen, On the Strategy of Trying to Reduce Economic 
Inequality by Expanding the Scale of Human Activity, in ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING ON BRUNDTLAND 41, 46 (Robert Goodland et al. eds., 
1991). 
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national decisions that could effectively address the national environmental 
policy and administrative apparatus of the nations participating in the trade 
agreement. 
II.  REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: A SPECIAL CASE? 
 This symposium addresses the social, political and environmental 
implications of regional trade agreements (RTAs).  With the above framework 
of the potential environmental implications of trade agreements in mind, the 
particular question for this essay, then, is whether (and if so, how) RTAs 
present an environmental protection challenge that differs from world-trade 
liberalization under the WTO umbrella.  That is, do RTAs present any 
particular hazard of greater environmental harm or any particular opportunities 
for mitigating any adverse environmental consequences of trade?  This part of 
the essay will argue that RTAs are no more environmentally hazardous than 
other trade agreements.  Rather, they present politically and geographically 
appropriate opportunities for the parties to RTAs to attend to their common 
environmental concerns. 
A. Defining and Classifying Regional Trade Agreements 
1. What is an RTA? 
 Commentaries on RTAs often cite a figure of about 400 agreements, a tally 
based on official notifications of such agreements to the WTO.25  A closer look 
at the WTO data, however, reveals that only half are still in force.26  Moreover, 
there is a substantial element of double counting in the data, since many 
agreements have been notified to the WTO both as free trade agreements 
(FTAs) and as agreements under the WTO’s enabling clause or Article V of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services.  Parsing the data, the tally of 
separately identifiable agreements still in force is much closer to 100 than 
400.27 
 
 25. WTO: Regional Trade Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/ 
region_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).  The website gives a figure of “close to 400 RTAs 
which are scheduled to be implemented by 2010.”  The same page also gives a figure of 380 
RTAs in force as of July, 2007.  The data are graphed and tabulated at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm.  See also, Fiorentino et al., supra note 3, at 5. 
 26. In many cases this is because an earlier agreement, such as the Canada-U.S. FTA, has 
been superseded by a later agreement; in that case NAFTA.  See, Fiorentino et al., supra note 3, at 
2–3. 
 27. WTO: Regional Trade Agreements, supra note 25.  This is another useful tabulation by 
the WTO which lists thirty-five separate area groupings of trade agreements.  Even this listing 
contains several overlaps.  For example, the Baltic Free Trade Area (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) has since been absorbed into the European Community (EC), and the Overseas 
Countries and Territories agreement extends most of the trading preferences of the EC to the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN RTAS 261 
What kinds of agreements are comprised in these 100 or so?  Nearly half 
are agreements within Europe, such as agreements between the EC and non-
EC European trading partners like Norway, Andorra and Albania, and 
agreements between two European countries outside the EC framework, such 
as a trade agreement between Switzerland and the Faroe Islands.28  If all of 
those agreements are lumped together to define the commercial zone of 
Europe, the number of separate geographically based RTAs falls even further. 
The non-European RTAs in the WTO database comprise multilateral 
agreements, bilateral agreements between neighboring states and bilateral 
agreements between states that are geographically distant.  Examples of the 
first type include NAFTA and the more recent U.S. initiative, the Dominican 
Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).29  These are 
RTAs in the truest sense of the term, embracing an entire region in a common 
trade arrangement.  The second type, bilateral trade agreements between 
neighboring states, is also distinctly regional in character.  Indeed, there are 
some clusters of bilateral agreements that collectively approximate a 
multilateral regional agreement.  For example, Mexico has bilateral trade 
agreements with Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras.30 
The third category, bilateral agreements with distant trading partners, does 
not merit the characterization “regional” in any meaningful sense.  Agreements 
between the United States and Israel, the European Free Trade Area and 
Lebanon, or the United States and the Republic of Korea (pending approval) 
are negotiated for political as well as commercial or economic advantage.  The 
United States has been especially active over the last ten years in negotiating 
such bilateral accords with willing partners around the globe, including Israel, 
Jordan, Australia, Singapore, Morocco, Bahrain and Korea (pending 
approval).31  Only a few of the bilateral FTAs with Latin American partners 
(Chile, Peru, Colombia and Panama) arguably fall within a true “regional” 
classification.  The WTO is rightly concerned that the proliferation of bilateral 
FTAs not linked to geographical proximity may weaken the resolve of major 
trading partners to maintain the integrity of the WTO system.  From an 
environmental perspective, however, there is very little to distinguish these 
agreements from the multilateral regime.  The additional liberalization of trade 
 
overseas countries and territories of EC members.  The MERCOSUR countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) are also members of the broader trading group known as the Latin 
American Integration Association. 
 28. Fiorentino et al., supra note 3, at 13–14. 
 29. Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR): Trade Agreements Home, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Section_Index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). 
 30. Foreign Trade Information Systems (SICE): Mexico Trade Agreements, 
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/MEX/MEXAgreements_e.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2008). 
 31. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Agreements Home, supra note 
29 (providing a full list of agreements). 
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tends to be narrowly focused on key sectors in the particular bilateral trade 
relationship.  The US-Korea FTA, for example, is meant to pry open the 
Korean market for increased U.S. exports of beef and automobiles. 
This essay goes into some detail in this analysis to set the terms of the 
discussion that follows.  For purposes of this essay, the author will restrict the 
use of the term “regional trade agreement” to those agreements, whether 
bilateral or multilateral, that bind geographically proximate states having, at 
least in principle, common interests in their shared natural environment.  
Linking trade liberalization with environmental protection is most plausible, 
and most important, among countries that share ecologies, especially countries 
close enough to each other that environmental behavior in one country may 
have a direct effect on another.  For the same reason, I will exclude from 
further consideration the cross-regional agreements.  Trading partners 
thousands of miles apart on separate continents are unlikely to have 
environmental issues of mutual interest beyond those of global scope.  Linking 
environment and trade in this context, though laudatory in the abstract, would 
have little practical effect.32 
2. Structural Classification of RTAs 
Limiting the agreements to be studied to bilateral or multilateral trade 
agreements among geographically proximate countries is only the first step in 
the analysis.  An understanding of the ramifications of RTAs for 
environmental protection must also consider the different types of trade 
agreements, which have correspondingly different possibilities for 
environmental harm and environmental collaboration. 
Trade typology differentiates between customs unions and FTAs.  In a 
customs union, the member states establish a single tariff and customs regime 
vis-à-vis non-members and eliminate all international trade formalities among 
members of the union.  The United States itself can be considered a customs 
union, with very tight restrictions on the power of the individual states to act in 
a way that affects commerce between the states or commerce with other 
nations.  The other customs union paradigm is the “single market” of the EC.  
In an FTA, by contrast, each member state retains its separate customs and 
tariff systems, but the members agree that all or most trade among them will be 
 
 32. Indeed, I would suggest that it was only because environmental issues are so 
inconsequential between the United States and Jordan that the United States chose to use that 
agreement as the first occasion to write into the trade agreement itself a provision that failure to 
enforce national environmental regulations against producers of traded goods could be the basis 
for withdrawal of trade benefits.  Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art. 5.3, 
Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M 63 (2002).  Of course, this provision has not yet been invoked by either 
party. 
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free of tariffs.  NAFTA is a free trade agreement; cross-border trade within 
North America is still subject to customs formalities but is almost entirely 
tariff free. 
The trade distinction between customs unions and FTAs mirrors a parallel 
distinction in the non-trade aspects of the economic relationship among the 
trading partners.  Customs unions tend to be characterized by deep integration 
of economic policy, touching not just trade in goods, but also the movement of 
people, tax systems and a drive towards uniformity in “domestic” regulatory 
arenas like environmental policy that may have some influence on competitive 
equivalence from one member to another within the “single market.”  The 
United States and the EC exemplify deep integration. 
FTAs, by contrast, are typically strictly commercial in nature and do not 
attempt to coordinate the policies of the participating governments on issues 
other than trade.  The preference for shallow integration was explicit in the 
negotiation of NAFTA; the countries self-consciously limited themselves to 
trade matters and left issues such as immigration, labor policy and tax policy to 
separate negotiation.33  The United States Congress and the administration of 
George H.W. Bush flagged environmental policy as a factor requiring attention 
in the NAFTA context, but it was largely put on a parallel track rather than 
integrated into negotiation of the trade agreement text.34 
B. Environmental Ramifications of RTAs 
The concern about RTAs in trade terms is that the economic and social 
benefits of equal, most favored nation treatment for all trading partners through 
a single set of rules under the WTO will be diminished or dissipated in the 
complex network of differing rules and special preferences for one trading 
partner or another across multiple RTAs.  For environmental policy, the 
corresponding concern about RTAs has two distinct elements.  First, would 
uniformity of environmental rules and practices throughout the world have 
similar theoretical benefits to the uniformity of trade law?  In other words, is 
the WTO, or an environmental counterpart to the WTO, the “first-best” 
approach to international environmental policy, at least insofar as it is linked 
with international trade in goods and services?  Or do regional environmental 
agreements have advantages over a worldwide set of rules and practices?  The 
second element of concern for RTAs is whether, in principle and in practice, 
 
 33. See generally, Frederick M. Abbott, The North American Integration Regime and Its 
Implications for the World Trading System (Jean Monnet Center, Working Paper No. 2/99, 1999), 
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990201.html. 
 34. Letter to Congressional Leaders on Fast Track Authority Extension and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 536–37 (May 1, 1991) 
(expressing the intent to expand cooperative environmental programs with Mexico “in parallel 
with the free trade talks”). 
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environmental policy coordination between countries can be effectively 
achieved or enhanced by linking bilateral or multilateral agreements and 
cooperation on environmental policy to the trade policy impetus behind RTAs. 
As trade agreements, RTAs are in all environmentally relevant elements 
virtually indistinguishable from the WTO agreements governing trade in 
goods.  Indeed, many of them use WTO agreement language more or less 
verbatim and acknowledge that the WTO agreements (as well as the RTA) 
continue to apply to trade relations between the parties.  Thus, in terms of the 
four possible effects of trade on the environment outlined in part I, RTAs and 
the WTO agreements are fundamentally interchangeable.  What distinguishes 
RTAs from the WTO agreements are the special provisions for tariff-free 
treatment of products being imported from an RTA member country and 
certain special quotas or preferences for products that are still not fully 
liberalized under the WTO system, especially agricultural goods.  These 
special preference provisions may divert trade away from non-member 
countries to RTA member countries (which explains the WTO concern about 
the proliferation of RTAs), but those trade preferences have no significant 
bearing on how RTAs might affect the environment or environmental 
regulation.  So the issue with respect to RTAs and the environment does not 
depend on the trade terms of RTAs, but on the differences in the political 
context in which the WTO and RTAs operate and the corresponding 
ramifications of those differences for transnational environmental policy 
coordination and collaboration. 
Many environmental concerns transcend national boundaries, and there is a 
broad consensus that international solutions to international environmental 
problems are preferable to a patchwork of unilateral national actions.  This 
consensus applies to such urgent questions as forest management, fisheries 
management, protection of the marine environment, endangered species 
protection and climate change, to mention only the most prominent examples.  
Closer to the issue of trade in manufactured goods, there has also been 
extensive international cooperation on management of industrial chemicals, 
pesticides and ozone-depleting substances, hazardous waste management and 
long-range transport of air contaminants.  To the extent that the international 
trading system has been seen as an impediment to some of these environmental 
initiatives, a number of scholars have called for the creation of a more robust 
international environmental organization that would have stature and political 
clout comparable to the WTO.35  Yet it is not apparent that international 
environmental cooperation has been significantly impeded by trade rules.  As 
 
 35. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, The Value of Creating a Global Environmental Organization, 
in ENV’T MATTERS 13, 13–14 (2000); Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 324 (2002); C. Ford Runge, A Global Environmental Organization 
(GEO) and the World Trading System, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 399, 422–23 (2001). 
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this author has argued elsewhere,36 weaknesses in international environmental 
policy and the difficulty of engaging the WTO’s serious interest in 
environmental matters reflect the general imbalance between economic and 
environmental policy seen in governments around the world.  Thus, the 
struggle to resolve tensions between trade and environment is really a struggle 
within nations to bring a higher profile to environmental concerns and to press 
for integration of the environment into trade policy at the national level.  Once 
this is accomplished, WTO policy, which reflects the collective will of national 
governments, will follow.  It is far from clear, then, that the WTO (and a 
counterpart World Environmental Organization (WEO)) would be the most 
effective avenue for managing the environmental effects of trade, especially 
for environmental matters of pollution, land use, habitat protection and 
resource extraction that are predominately local or national in character. 
RTAs may well be the better vehicle to enhance environmental protections.  
A commitment on the part of two or more governments to negotiate an RTA 
provides an excellent political opportunity for environmental interests within 
each country to press their governments to pay attention to common 
environmental interests as they are discussing closer economic coordination 
and mutual economic benefit through the RTA.  Moreover, the argument that 
the nations involved have common environmental concerns is much easier to 
make for a small number of countries in one region than for all 150 members 
of the WTO.  At the regional level, it is easier to identify specific issues that 
should be addressed and to devise and agree on specific solutions or specific 
mechanisms for addressing those issues collaboratively.  As described in more 
detail below, the negotiation of the North American Agreement for 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), in conjunction with the final approval 
of NAFTA, illustrates how the linkage between an RTA and environmental 
issues can be made.37 
III.  REALIZING THE POTENTIAL 
 The previous section argued that the negotiation of an RTA presents a 
special opportunity to strengthen environmental protection programs among 
the parties.  The challenge is to realize that potential.  This depends on two 
broad factors: mutuality of environmental interest and the political will of the 
parties.  Mutuality of environmental interest is, to some extent, to be assumed 
among countries that are engaged in a true RTA based on geographic 
proximity.  Nevertheless, that mutuality of interest needs to be identified and 
 
 36. See Sanford E. Gaines, The Problem of Enforcing Environmental Norms in the WTO and 
What to Do About It, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321 (2003). 
 37. See generally, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter “NAAEC”]; North American Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32. I.L.M. 289. 
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politically validated.  The matter of political will is less predictable and less 
susceptible to generalization, but just as with national environmental statutes 
and agencies, the effectiveness of environmental programs depends on 
sustained levels of funding and administration and enforcement of program 
requirements over many years. 
The prime example of a positive combination of mutual environmental 
interest and political will is the accumulation of environmental regulatory 
authority at the European Union (EU), advancing environmental protection 
measures throughout Europe in tandem with the deepening economic 
integration of the EU’s commercial and trade aspect, the EC.  The EC grew out 
of modest beginnings of economic cooperation on coal and steel production 
among France, Germany and the Benelux countries in the 1950s to its current 
embrace of a comprehensive “single market” for all goods and services among 
twenty-seven European nations.38  As the economic cooperation deepened, the 
tripartite administrative structure of the EU—the European Commission, the 
European Court of Justice and the European Parliament—took shape as part of 
a cooperative program to deal with all the factors that influenced the single 
market, specifically including protection of the environment. 
With many transnational river basins and rapid transport of air pollution 
from one country to another in the relatively confined spaces of Europe, there 
was no controversy about the mutuality of interest in the condition of the 
environment.  What gave political impetus to Europe-wide environmental 
regulation was the underlying and powerful political commitment to the single 
market.  This political will gained expression over time in the renegotiation of 
the treaties that bind the EU and EC together, with environmental protection 
now specifically mentioned as a matter of European concern as well as 
national concern.39 
Few RTAs follow the deep integration model of Europe.  Much more 
common is the shallow integration of a regional FTA, in which the agreement 
focuses almost exclusively on trade issues and leaves all other policy areas to 
be worked out among the parties through separate arrangements.  The leading 
example of an RTA accompanied by a robust structure for environmental 
cooperation is NAFTA and its associated NAAEC.40  The NAAEC was, and 
remains, a pioneering agreement, the first agreement among nations for 
environmental cooperation across a broad range of issues with an independent 
administrative structure and a budget.  The NAFTA parties may have 
 
 38. Europa, The EU at a Glance, The History of the European Union, http://europa.eu/ 
abc/history/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). 
 39. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, arts. 2, 174–
76, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37. 
 40. NAAEC, supra note 37. 
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eschewed the “deep” integration of Europe, but the politics of NAFTA gave a 
strong political impetus to environmental cooperation. 
Because environmental organizations in the United States and their allies 
in Congress had political leverage over the approval of NAFTA, they were 
able to persuade trade officials and political leaders to give serious 
consideration to environmental issues in the NAFTA context.41  But, with a 
few exceptions, the trade negotiators were not willing to introduce 
environmental considerations into NAFTA itself.  Instead, interested parties 
explored parallel mechanisms for addressing environmental concerns. 
The proposal for a three-nation environmental commission was one of the 
ideas that emerged from discussions between trade officials and environmental 
leaders.  A base of bilateral environmental and resource cooperation going 
back a century already existed between the United States and Mexico to the 
south and the United States and Canada to the north.  Some common 
environmental interests of the three countries were also apparent in the 
contexts of migratory birds, whales and the monarch butterfly, which has 
become part of the logo of the North American Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC).42  The idea of a three-nation agreement and an 
administrative structure for environmental cooperation was thus generally well 
received in all three governments.  The only contentious part of the 
negotiations was over the insistence by the United States that NAAEC include 
a trade-sanctions mechanism if one of the countries persistently failed to 
enforce its own environmental laws, a provision born out of the perceived 
political necessity to address the competitiveness concern surrounding 
NAFTA.43 
The CEC has undertaken interesting research, data collection and 
publications that demonstrate more vividly than ever before the ecological 
connections in North America, the long-range transport of air pollutants and 
the common interests of the three countries in managing toxic chemicals.44  It 
 
 41. Frederick W. Mayer, Negotiating the NAFTA: Political Lessons for the FTAA, in 
GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFTA’S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE 97, 98 (Carolyn L. 
Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002). 
 42. See generally Commission for Environmental Cooperation, North American Agenda for 
Action: 2003–2005 (2003), available at, http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/ABOUTUS/3yp03-05_ 
en.pdf. 
 43. Mayer, supra note 41, at 99, 104–05.  For the provision, see NAAEC, supra note 37, at 
1483–84.  It is also worth noting that after nearly fifteen years, the three governments have taken 
no steps to implement the trade sanctions section of the agreement. 
 44. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, CEC to Report on Air Pollutants, (1996), 
available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/ecoregion/eco2-4/eco2-4.cfm.  See 
generally Secretariat to the CEC, Environmental Challenges and Opportunities of the Evolving 
North American Electricity Market, 7 (2002), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf//CEC_ 
Art13electricity_Eng.pdf. 
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has also dealt with common concerns over biodiversity protection, green 
tourism, green buildings, the electric power system, enforcement of 
environmental laws and conservation efforts in our shared marine 
environments.45  The common environmental interests among the three 
countries are thus firmly established and beyond political dispute.  
Nevertheless, the CEC has steadily lost stature and effectiveness over time.  
Although it started strongly with an assertive first executive director and strong 
political support from Washington, the political will to sustain it as a vigorous 
institution for environmental cooperation has faded away in all three countries 
over its fifteen-year history.  The CEC’s budget, set at $9 million at the 
beginning ($3 million from each country), has not changed since; in constant 
dollar terms, its budget shrinks each year.46  With changes in political party 
leadership in all three countries, moreover, the personal commitment of the 
founding political leaders to its success is no longer a factor.  For this and other 
reasons, what was a promising initiative throughout the 1990s has gradually 
become a much more modestly useful but increasingly truncated mechanism 
for environmental cooperation. 
One politically salient element of the NAAEC that continues to be a model 
for U.S. RTA policy is the provision in Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC that 
allow citizens or organizations in any of the three countries to submit to the 
CEC a claim that a country is failing to enforce its own environmental law in 
some specific instance.47  The CEC, which is an international organization 
independent of any of the governments, is then authorized to ask the 
government in question to respond to the citizen claim.  Depending on the 
government’s response, the CEC may undertake to develop a “factual record” 
of the case, documenting exactly what occurred with respect to enforcement or 
non-enforcement of the law in question.48  With the approval of two of the 
three environmental ministers who constitute the governing council of the 
CEC, the factual record is then made public.  This citizen submission 
 
 45. See generally CEC.org, Publications and Documents: Secretariat Reports, 
http://www.cec.org/pubs_docs/scope/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=16 (last visited Sept. 25, 
2008); CEC.org, Our Programs and Projects, http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/ 
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 46. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Looking to the Future: Strategic Plan of 
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2005–2010 6 (June 17, 2005), available at 
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 47. NAAEC, supra note 37, at 1485. 
 48. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Bringing the Facts to Light: A Guide to 
Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 1(2000) 
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procedure has been initiated sixty-five times, resulting in fifteen factual 
records.49 
This innovative procedure is very popular with environmental advocates 
and citizen organizations, but because the citizen submissions tend to be 
embarrassing to the governments, the unfortunate effect has been to sharply 
reduce the political support of the three environment ministers for the CEC.  
There is a substantial risk, then, that the opportunity for citizens to bring 
failures of environmental enforcement to an independent organization for 
investigation, which is now replicated in other RTAs negotiated by the United 
States, will undermine the governments’ support for more substantive 
programs for environmental cooperation.  The net effect might be that creating 
the opportunity for the occasional citizen initiative to promote environmental 
enforcement, with primarily localized environmental benefits, creates 
fundamental obstacles to more far-reaching initiatives that might bring 
environmental improvement to member countries on a larger scale. 
Though the political will of the NAFTA parties appears to be faltering with 
respect to the CEC, later U.S. RTAs have pushed forward with new 
environmental initiatives, suggesting the continued vitality of RTAs as 
vehicles for environmental policy improvement.  DR-CAFTA, which includes 
the citizen submission mechanism directly in the trade agreement, showed 
moderate political will and modest promise.  The U.S.-Colombia agreement, 
not yet approved, goes another step forward, bringing directly into the trade 
agreement such provisions as a mutual commitment to adopt domestic 
legislation to implement some major multilateral environmental agreements, 
guarantees on public participation and access to justice, and creation, through a 
provision in the trade agreement itself, of a bilateral Environmental Affairs 
Council.50  Like DR-CAFTA, the agreement with Colombia is also paired with 
a separate Environmental Cooperation Agreement, which is a slimmed-down 
version of the NAAEC.51 
 
 49. Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Current Status of Filed Submissions, 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The environmental effects of trade liberalization involve the consequences 
of increasing the scale of economic activity and changing the composition of 
the particular goods or services being produced and traded.  In other words, the 
environmental effects of the economic changes induced by trade liberalization 
are essentially the same as the environmental effects of any national economic 
policy that seeks to increase production of goods and services and shift 
production over time to higher value goods and services where the nation has 
an advantage in terms of its natural, human and capital resources.  The biggest 
environmental challenge of trade liberalization, then, is to extend and intensify 
national environmental programs in all trading partners to cope with the 
changes in production. 
Nevertheless, integration of environmental and trade policy at the regional 
level creates a special opportunity for neighboring countries to broaden and 
deepen their cooperation on environmental matters of common concern or 
cross-border effect, issues that are otherwise often neglected.  The observed 
practice of countries in North America and Europe confirms the hypothesis 
that environmental policy coordination in conjunction with trade compacts can 
be strong among geographic neighbors with close ecological connections. 
But even when the ecological and economic ties are close, as they are in 
Europe and North America, deepening environmental cooperation between two 
or more countries demands a high level of human and financial resources over 
many years to yield tangible results.  Collaboration takes more time and effort 
than unilateral action, and language and cultural differences can make 
international collaboration especially difficult to accomplish.  Moreover, 
regional environmental cooperation also requires national environmental 
officials of all participating countries to expend the effort and take the political 
risk to advance changes in domestic environmental programs or laws and 
regulations in order to pursue internationally agreed common objectives.  
Similarly, with respect to financial support, for a national environmental 
agency to acquire a sufficient budget to implement cooperative measures at the 
international level is a substantial political challenge.  It is even more 
politically difficult to get several governments to agree jointly to fund an 
international environmental organization to carry forward regional 
environmental cooperation somewhat independently of the national 
governments. 
Regional environmental cooperation will work effectively only with strong 
and sustained national political leadership in all the participating countries.  
The single example of such robust and sustained political will for 
environmental cooperation in connection with trade is the EC, where 
environmental protection has advanced in tandem with the increasing depth 
and breadth of economic integration in Europe over the last forty years.  North 
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America seemed to have a chance in the 1990s to successfully launch a 
different model of cooperation in conjunction with NAFTA, but the political 
will of the 1990s to engage in continent-wide environmental improvement has 
since receded in all three countries.  The new environmental institution, the 
CEC, and its agenda of work are slowly atrophying, while the governments 
have reverted to sovereignty-based behaviors that are thwarting once-
promising CEC initiatives. 
Even so, environmental cooperation has become a staple of United States 
RTA trade policy.  DR-CAFTA, and even more clearly the new U.S-Colombia 
FTA, incorporate substantial and relatively robust environmental performance 
requirements directly into the trade agreement, trade provisions that were 
considered unthinkable fifteen years ago.  It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the texts and the environmental cooperation agreements are translated 
into specific environmental improvements or policy initiatives in the decades 
ahead. 
As a final observation, only a small fraction of the work of environmental 
cooperation in the environmental institutions of Europe or North America is 
specifically linked to trade.  The CEC, for example, has become a forum for 
information sharing and capacity building for enhanced environmental 
monitoring and enforcement at the national level.  It established and has 
supervised an industry-government cooperative effort to reduce the production 
of persistent organic pollutants in North America under its Sound Management 
of Chemicals program.  It has engaged in new studies on neglected issues of 
common concern, such as transport of air pollutants, including dioxins that are 
especially concentrated in the Canadian Arctic, electric power generation and 
transmission, and promotion of shade-grown coffee cultivation in Mexico. 
The perennial quest to get environmental considerations integrated into 
trade policy has merit and has generated some useful reforms and some new 
ideas about the interaction of environment and trade.  In the final analysis, 
though, the hard work of preventing further environmental degradation and 
improving environmental conditions, even in accordance with international 
mandates, has to be accomplished at the national and local levels.  Regional 
trade agreements present an opportunity to bring new vigor to regional 
cooperation to encourage and support that national-level environmental work, 
but only if political leaders are prepared to seize it. 
In sum, international environmental cooperation depends on and benefits 
from an emphasis on the environmental reality of the cooperating countries.  
The greatest environmental gains have come about through institutions and 
procedures that have no direct connection to trade or the trade agreements that 
initially spawned them. 
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